Adjudication of Gender Prosecution Cases under the Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No Reason to Fear an Onslaught of Asylum Claims by Pell, Stephanie Kaye
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 20 | Number 3 Article 6
Summer 1995
Adjudication of Gender Prosecution Cases under
the Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No
Reason to Fear an Onslaught of Asylum Claims
Stephanie Kaye Pell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephanie K. Pell, Adjudication of Gender Prosecution Cases under the Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No Reason to Fear an
Onslaught of Asylum Claims, 20 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 655 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol20/iss3/6
Adjudication of Gender Prosecution Cases under the Canada Guidelines:
The United States Has No Reason to Fear an Onslaught of Asylum Claims
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This comments is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol20/iss3/6
COMMENT
Adjudication of Gender Persecution Cases Under
the Canada Guidelines: The United States Has
No Reason to Fear an Onslaught of
Asylum Claimst
Fatimah's Story'
Fatimah was born in Mali, Africa in 1958. Fatimah's mother, adhering
to her interpretation of Islamic culture and religion in Mali, had her daughter
genitally mutilated2 at the age of four. In 1986, Fatimah married Hassain
and they had one son, Tiab. In 1989, Hassain received funding from the
government in Mali to pursue a graduate degree at a university in North Caro-
lina. Hassain decided to take Fatimah with him, but forced her to leave their
son behind. Fatimah related that her husband continued to beat her in
America, as he had done in Mali. She said that Hassain felt that he had the
right to beat her because the religious culture and government in Mali allows
men to beat their wives.
3
Because Fatimah was genitally mutilated, sex was very painful for her
and thus she never wanted to have sex. Due to Fatimah's lack of sexual inter-
est, Hassain generally went elsewhere for intercourse. There were times, how-
ever, when Hassain demanded sex from Fatimah and he refused to use birth
control. As a result, Fatimah has given birth to two sons while in the United
States. Hassain took no interest in the welfare of the children. He would leave
for periods of time without telling Fatimah where he was. Because Hassain
refused to provide any monetary support for the children, Fatimah took two jobs
to support the children and walked to work everyday, even when she was nine
months pregnant with her second son.
The day before she gave birth to her second son, she was bleeding all after-
t The author would like to thank I.F. Liebich and Krista M. Daley of the Immigration
and Refugee Board for providing the Canadian gender persecution cases and other
pertinent information.
I The facts described are based on an actual asylum claim pending at Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) in Arlington, Virginia. The names and some of the details have
been changed in order to protect the privacy of the client. An application and brief
supporting Fatimah's asylum claim was filed with INS in June 1994 and is on file at the law
offices of Manlin Chee in Greensboro, N.C.
2 For a description of female genital mutilation, see infra note 5.
3 "'Violence against women, including wife beating, is accepted in Malian society,
though there are no statistics to indicate how widespread it may be .... Legal action for
redress of injury is not normally available.' " Karen Bower, Note, Recognizing Violence Against
Women as Persecution on the Basis of Membership in a Particular Social Group, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
173, 186-87 (1993) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES FOR 1990, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991)).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
noon, and her husband refused to drive her to the hospital. She contacted a
local church for help, and two women from the church drove her to the hospital
where her second son was born by cesarean section. Touched by the kindness of
the Christian women, Fatimah gave her newborn son a Christian middle name.
Hassain was infuriated by the idea of his son having a Christian name, and so
he refused to visit his son in the hospital or even acknowledge that he was the
father.
After Hassain returned to Mali without her, Fatimah continued to receive
help from the local church, and she began to explore the Christian religion. She
says that she finds strength in the teachings of the Christian religion, and that
this strength helps her to deal with her problems. She works ten hours a day to
support her children and then teaches her oldest, a pre-schooler, to read in the
evenings.
If Fatimah and her children were returned to Mali, she believes that she
would be unable to take care of her children. She fears that her husband would
continue to beat her and provide no support to their children. According to
Fatimah, the Malian government will not help women who are beaten by their
husbands and thus she would have no way to protect herself Fatimah knows
that her husband would continue, at times, to demand intercourse from her. As
well as being extremely painfu4 the doctor that examined Fatimah noted that
forced intercourse would exacerbate recurrent sores and thicken the scar tissue
resulting from the mutilation she experienced as a child. The continued pro-
duction and aggravation of these sores makes Fatimah very susceptible to infec-
tion. Fatimah also fears that she would be unable to get a job to support her
children because of their Christian middle names. Fatimah believes both her
husband and the society would treat her and her children as outcasts based on
their association with the Christian religion.
I. Introduction
Under U.S. asylum law,4 it is unlikely that gender-based persecu-
tion claims, such as Fatimah's spousal abuse and rape claims or female
genital mutilation claims, 5 will be recognized as legitimate forms of
4 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(1988) [hereinafter INA], an applicant must meet the definition of refugee in order to be
granted asylum in the United States. The INA defines a "refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that coun-
try because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42)(A)-(B) (1988). Furthermore, once an applicant proves eligibility for
asylum by meeting the refugee definition, the immigration judge still has discretion to deny
asylum. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a) (42), 1158 (1988). While the discretionary power of an immi-
gration judge is broad, courts have imposed limits. See Melendez v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that threshold findings of fact upon which
a discretionary denial is based must pass the substantial evidence test); Matter of Pula, Int.
Dec. 3033 (BIA 1987) (stating that the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures is not
alone sufficient to deny asylum in the exercise of discretion).
5 Practiced for more than 2500 years primarily in Africa and the Middle East, female
genital mutilation (FGM), sometimes called female circumcision, involves the cutting away of
part or all of the external female genitalia. Alison T. Slack, Female Circumcision: A Critical
Appraisal 10 HuM. Rrs. Q. 437, 439 (1988). The instruments used to perform FGM include
kitchen knives, old razor blades, broken glass, sharp stones, and scalpels. Id. at 442. The
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persecution entitling women to asylum. In fact, if Fatimah is able to
establish eligibility for discretionary grant of asylum, her refugee status
will probably result from a determination that she has a well-founded
fear of persecution based on her Christian religious practices, not on
the fact that she will be beaten and raped by her spouse if she is re-
turned to Mali. A major reason for the continued denial of gender
persecution claims is that such claims, like rape, are generally consid-
ered private rather than public matters, even when perpetrated by a
government agent or occurring during a political conflict. 6 Tradi-
tional interpretations of what constitutes a refugee all include the criti-
cal quality of "political," which is drawn from public sphere activities
dominated primarily by men.7 Because the site of women's oppression
most often occurs in the private sphere, where acts of violence gener-
ally go unrecognized by the public world, women's persecutory exper-
iences are ignored by the refugee definition. This general denial of
women's persecution can be characterized as a public/private dichot-
omy where "state oppression of a religious minority is political, while
gender oppression at home is not."
8
World-wide opinions about the legitimacy of gender persecution
claims as a basis for refugee status are slowly beginning to change, how-
ever. For example, Dorris M. Meissner, the Commissioner of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Services (INS), has commented that "gender
based asylum claims-such as those filed by some Muslim and Bosnian
women based on their rape by Serbian soldiers during the civil war in
the former Yugoslavia-present a 'persuasive argument' that the INS
most severe form of the practice is called infibulation where the majority of the external
genitalia are removed, and the open area is then sewn shut with a tiny hole left for the
passing of urine and menstrual fluid. Id. at 441-42. The operation has been performed by
Christians, Jews, Animasts, and atheists, but has most heavily been practiced by Muslims. Id.
at 446. Although the practice is often supported by Islamic leaders, there is no scripture in
the Koran that requires female genital mutilation. Id. at 446. One writer reported that the
shale equivalent of female genital mutilation would be "amputation or cutting of the penis
and its surrounding tissues." A. M. Rosenthal, Female Genital Torture, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12,
1993, at A33. For a discussion of the practice, the health consequences, and the arguments
for and against FGM, see Slack, supra, at 437-86.
6 Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women,
26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 628 (1993) (describing the facts of Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809
F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987)). Kelly's general thesis is that U.S. asy-
lum law must incorporate the advances in international human rights that address violence
against women. Id. at 569. See also Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace But Home: Asylum in the United
States for Women Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INr'L L.J. 565 (1993). Goldberg argues
that under U.S. asylum law, women are much less likely than men to be found eligible for
asylum, but demonstrates how gender-based claims can be incorporated into each of the four
requirements of the refugee definition. Id. at 527.
7 SeeJacqueline Greatbatch, The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse, 1
INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 518 (1989). Greatbatch argues for an expansive approach in determining
refugee status, which includes the recognition of women as a particular social group and
requires the adoption of guidelines and practices which will provide women access to the
system and proper adjudication of their claims. Id. at 519.
s Kelly, supra note 6, at 628 (citing Doreen Indra, A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experi-
ence, 6 REFUGEE 3 (1987)).
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will have to be sensitive to over time." a Far more progressive are the
Canada Guidelines, 10 which recognize that gender-based violence is a
legitimate form of persecution for the purpose of granting refugee sta-
tus. These guidelines are an international first in breaking the public/
private dichotomy. The Canada Guidelines forge a new understanding
and acknowledgment of gender persecution as they "set out a system-
atic method" for the evaluation of claims on the applicable grounds of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
and political opinion." Since the creation of the Canada Guidelines
in March 1993, there has not been an increase in either the number of
women making asylum claims or the number of asylum claims granted
to women.
12
Unlike the Canadian system, U.S. asylum law, both in its present
form and its interpretation by the courts, offers few concrete possibili-
ties of asylum for women fleeing gender-based persecution. 13 This
Comment takes the position that this injustice exists because of an un-
derlying fear that if the definition of refugee is expanded to include
forms of persecution occurring in the private sphere, the "floodgate
will burst" and millions of women will suddenly have legitimate claims
for asylum. In other words, any move by the courts or by Congress to
open up the. refugee definition to include the types of persecution ex-
perienced by women will potentially expose the United States to an
onslaught of legitimate asylum claims. In response to this concern,
this Comment argues that the Canadian system is presently recogniz-
ing gender-based persecution claims while successfully controlling the
floodgate problem by using the Canada Guidelines to establish clear
standards for distinguishing real forms of gender persecution from
mere dislike of a country's law or policy.
Part II of this Comment examines some of the particular difficul-
ties that women face when making gender persecution claims in U.S.
courts. Specifically, this section discusses the problems that women
refugee claimants face in the interview process and potential problems
for women refugee claimants under the new asylum procedures that
9 Pamela Goldberg, Asylum Law and Gender-Based Persecution Claims, IMMIGR. BRIEF-
INGS, Sept. 1994, at 1, 2 (quoting Ms. Meissner's statement in 70 Interpreter Releases 1470
(Nov. 8, 1993)).
10 IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT
TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT, WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-
RELATED PERSECUTION (1993) [hereinafter CANADA GUIDELINES].
11 Goldberg, supra note 9, at 4.
12 Telephone Interview with Krista M. Daley, Legal Advisor, Immigration and Refugee
Board of Canada (Apr. 3, 1995). Ms. Daley stated that the decision making process regarding
women's asylum claims has become more consistent since the implementation of the Guide-
lines. Id. Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board has adjudicated approximately 150 gen-
der-based cases and granted asylum to seventy percent of the applicants. Goldberg, supra
note 9, at 4.
IS See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6; Kelly, supra note 6.
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went into effect on December 5, 1994.14 This section then asserts that
generally American courts have narrowly defined the categories of per-
secution, such as "membership in a particular social group" or "polit-
ical opinion," in order to ensure that the United States is not faced
with uncontrollable numbers of refugees. Part III then analyzes both
the Canada Guidelines and a representative sample of cases adjudi-
cated under the Canada Guidelines. Ultimately, this section argues
that the Canada Guidelines "keep the floodgate from bursting" be-
cause they follow a systematic method for identifying and evaluating
gender persecution claims. Finally, Part IV concludes that the United
States should follow Canada in its recognition and protection of wo-
men fleeing gender persecution.
II. U.S. Law and Policy
To establish eligibility for asylum in the United States, an appli-
cant must show that he or she has been persecuted or has a well-
founded fear of persecution from either a government official or from
a group or individual that the government cannot or will not control. 15
The applicant must also show that the basis of the persecution is on
account of either her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group. 16 Making this showing for a
gender-based persecution claim, that is, fitting gender based persecu-
tion claims into the U.S. asylum law definition, requires that an appli-
cant meet four general factors.
17
The easiest factor to meet is the first requirement: that a woman's
fear of gender-based persecution is well-founded. 18 The U.S. Supreme
Court has decided that a "well-founded fear" means a reasonable possi-
bility that an individual will be persecuted. 19 The Court also requires
14 Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum or Withholding of
Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284 (1994) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 236, 242, 274a, 299) [hereinafter New Asylum Regulations].
15 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). For the text of the statute, see supra note 4.
16 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
17 The four factors are: (1) The fear that the woman has of gender-based persecution is
a well-founded fear, Goldberg, supra note 6, at 572; (2) The acts that have either been com-
mitted against the woman or that the woman fears will be committed against her if she is
returned to her home country amount to persecution, id.; (3) The state is liable for persecu-
tion either by means of its own agent(s) or by its inability or unwillingness to stop the perse-
cutors, id. at 573; (4) The woman is persecuted on account of one of the five enumerated
grounds in the statutory definition: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or member-
ship in a particular social group, id. at 574.
The Goldberg article presents a comprehensive analysis of the four general factors re-
quired to obtain refugee status and suggests how women making gender-based persecution
claims, specifically claims of intimate violence, can satisfy these, requirements. See id. Rather
than repeating a similar detailed legal analysis, the present Comment focuses on the "burst-
ing of the floodgate" fear that underlies U.S. asylum, law.,
18 Id. at 573.
19 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (citing INS v. Stevic, 426 U.S. 407,
424-25 (1984)). The Court stated that a person can have a well-founded fear of persecution
with less than a fifty percent chance that the persecution will take place. Id. at 431. In fact,
1995]
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the applicant to show both a subjective and an objective element of
fear.20 A subjective fear means that the applicant's fear is genuine, 2'
insofar as the fear puts the applicant in "a state of apprehension or
anxiety not usually subject to rational measurement."22 An objective
fear means that the applicant's fear is reasonable, that is the fear has
"some basis in the reality of the circumstances"23 and is not just "mere
irrational apprehension."24 Therefore, an applicant who successfully
establishes a well-founded fear of persecution has shown that she faces
a reasonable possibility of persecution if returned to her country, and
that she has both a subjective and objective fear of persecution.2 5
Although considered the easiest requirement for an applicant
bringing a gender-based persecution claim to meet, the well-founded
fear standard can pose obstacles or problems different from those
faced by applicants making non-gender-based persecution claims. One
such problem may arise at the initial INS interview.2 6 This interview is
the applicant's first chance to tell her story, and either asylum will be
granted or her case will be referred to an immigration judge.2 7
Problems can arise because the applicant feels uncomfortable or
ashamed of discussing with a male interviewer the nature of her perse-
cution, which often includes rape, gang rape by pirates, and other
forms of sexual abuse.28 Some female applicants come from cultures
that blame the woman if she is sexually assaulted, and these applicants
have an especially hard time describing the events that happened to
them.2 9 Because very few countries have female staff involved in their
even a one-in-ten chance that the persecution will take place is sufficient to show that the fear
is well-founded, Id.
20 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-32.
21 Matter of Mogharrai, Int. Dec. 3028, 12 (BIA 1987).
22 Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). Guevara-Flores was cited
by the Board of Immigration Appeals [hereinafter BIA] as correctly interpreting Cardoza-
Fonseca. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 576 n.39 (citing Matter of Mogharrai, Int. Dec. 3028, [15]
(BIA 1987)).
23 Guevara-Flores, 786 F.2d at 1249.
24 Id
25 Id. An applicant can establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution even if
she does not have a well-founded fear of present or future persecution. Matter of Chen, Int.
Dec. 3104, 6-7 (BIA 1989). Establishing past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption
that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Matter of Chen, at 7; see also 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
26 In the new asylum regulations that became effective on December 5, 1994, every
asylum applicant who files a complete application will receive an initial, non-adversarial inter-
view by an INS asylum officer. See New Asylum Regulations, supra note 14, at 62,284-85. The
asylum officer can either grant asylum or refer the cases of applicants who are excludable or
deportable to an immigration judge for a decision. Id. No "Notices of Intent to Deny" or
written denials will be issued, except in cases where the applicant is currently in valid immi-
gration status and not subject to deportation or exclusion proceedings. Id.
27 Id.
28 Anders B. Johnsson, International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary of Principal
Problems and Issues, 1 Irrr'LJ. REFUGEE L. 221, 223 (1989).
29 During the summer of 1994, while the author was a legal intern in the Resettlement
Division of the United Nations High Commissioner (UNHCR) for Refugees in Geneva, Swit-
zerland, she read over 700 case files of "women at risk." A "woman at risk" is a woman who
660 [VOL. 20
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refugee determination procedures, 30 women bringing gender-based
persecution claims usually speak with male interviewers. Unable to
fully express their stories, they can have difficulty meeting the subjec-
tive and objective elements of the well-founded fear standard.
The difficulties of meeting this first requirement may intensify
with the new asylum procedures. These new procedures establish a
"grant-refer" system whereby asylum officers will either grant asylum or
refer the applicant to an immigration judge for deportation or exclu-
sion proceedings.31 Whereas the old procedures required the asylum
officer to issue a notice of intent to deny asylum (NOID), the new pro-
cedures no longer include NOIDs, and no longer give the applicant
the opportunity to rebut the intended denial at this initial stage of the
administrative process.32 The immigration judge receives the appli-
cant's case without any written record of why the asylum officer did not
grant asylum. Thus, if the asylum officer denied the woman's claim
because she was not able to express details of her situation, which
made her unable to establish either the subjective or objective element
of the well-founded fear standard, neither the immigration judge nor
the applicant's attorney would have a written record of this reason for
the denial. A written record could indicate to the attorney that the
applicant needs to become more comfortable in telling her story, as
well as indicating to the immigration judge that a particular applicant
may have experienced traumas that are difficult to talk about. Of
course, it is too early to tell if this problem will intensify with the new
asylum procedures because they went into effect only on December 5,
1994. However, commentators on the new asylum procedures have
criticized the elimination of the NOID requirement on the grounds
that the NOID protects applicants' rights and insures more accurate
decisions by asylum officers.33
Another element of the refugee definition that poses particular
problems for women making gender-based claims is the requirement
that the persecution experienced by the women must be on account of
either her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
has no other family with her, or a woman who has become the head of her family due to the
death or missing status of the former male head of the family and is at risk of physical danger
or persecution due to the fact that she is alone. Some of these files were about Vietnamese
boat women who, on their way to Indonesia, were brutally raped and humiliated by pirates
and crews of other vessels. The staff members who interviewed these women in Indonesia
continually noted that these women did not want their families or husbands to find out what
happened because it would bring shame on the families. The staff members also noted that
these women had difficulty in accepting that they were not to blame for their assaults. Fortu-
nately, because UNHCR negotiates directly with foreign governments like the United States,
these refugees in the resettlement process do not go through normal asylum procedures and
are not generally required to tell their stories to male interviewers.
30 Johnsson, supra note 28, at 223.
31 71 Interpreter Releases 1577, 1579 (Dec. 5, 1994).
32 See New Asylum Regulations, supra note 14, at 62,285.
33 71 Interpreter Releases 1577, 1579 (Dec. 5, 1994).
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in a particular social group.34 Applicants making gender-based perse-
cution claims in the United States have trouble gaining refugee status
because the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol do not explicitly
recognize gender as a category upon which persecution can be
based,35 and U.S. asylum law has generally failed to incorporate gen-
der-based claims into one of the existing enumerated grounds of per-
secution.3 6 Insofar as gender is not directly recognized as a protected
category, incorporating gender-based claims into the existing refugee
definition requires a broad-based interpretation of "persecution," 37 a
34 The 1980 Refugee Act states that the Attorney General has the authority to grant
asylum to any person who meets the statutory definition of refugee (see INA § 208(s), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988)) by showing persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). For the text of the refugee definition, see supra
note 4.
In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1(2), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter
1967 Protocol], which incorporated Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. By
signing and ratifying the 1967 Protocol, the United States voluntarily assumed certain obliga-
tions with regard to refugees. Congress incorporated these obligations through the Refugee
Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988). Kelly, supra note 6, at 634. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987), the Supreme Court acknowledged that, by enacting the 1980 Refugee
Act, Congress brought U.S. law into conformity with its international obligations under the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Id. at 436. The Court noted that "the
definition of 'refugee' that Congress adopted (citations omitted) is virtually identical to the
one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Convention." Id. at 437.
35 See 1951 Convention, supra note 34; 1967 Protocol, supra note 34.
36 Goldberg, supra note 6, at 588. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that possession of broad characteristics such as youth and gender will not by them-
selves establish persecution based on membership in a particular social group, even though
Ms. Gomez was raped and brutalized by Salvadoran soldiers in her youth); Campos-Guardado
v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987) (holding that Ms. Cam-
pos-Guardado was not persecuted on account of any political opinion she herself possessed
or was believed by the soldiers to possess, even though she was brutally raped and forced to
watch her uncle and cousins tortured and killed by Salvadoran soldiers). But see Fatin v. INS,
12 F.3d 1233, 1237, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that an innate characteristic like gen-
der could create a particular social group, but denying the applicant's persecution claim
based on her membership in the particular social group of women who refused to wear a veil
because she did not show that complying with the restrictions that Islamic law places on
women was tantamount to persecution for her); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1433-35
(9th Cir. 1987) (granting asylum based primarily on the idea that the Salvadoran army ser-
geant, who harassed, raped, and forced Ms. Lazo-Majano to perform unpaid labor for him,
had imputed the political opinion of subversive to the applicant when he threatened that if
she reported him, he would kill her and then say that she was a subversive).
3 Neither the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol nor the 1980 Refugee Act provide
an actual definition of persecution. According to commentators, the omission of a precise
definition for persecution was a deliberate attempt by the drafters to permit a case-by-case
determination of whether any particular action or conduct constituted a persecutory act.
Goldberg, supra note 6, at 577 (citingJAmEs C. HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STATUS 104
(1991) (citing, inter alia, Atle Grahl-Madsen, Identifying the World's Refugees, 467 ANNALS AM.
AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 11, 15 (1983))); see also GtU S. GOODwIN GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 40 (1983) ("There being no limits to the perverse side of human imagination,
little purpose is served by attempting to list all known measures of persecution. Assessments
must be made from case to case by taking account, on the one hand, of the notion of individ-
ual integrity and human dignity and, on the other hand, of the manner and degree to which
they stand to be injured.").
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recognition that "state liability" encompasses harms committed by pri-
vate actors, not just state actors,38 and an open interpretation of the
five types of persecution recognized by the refugee definition, particu-
larly the categories of political opinion and membership in a particular
social group.39
Why do U.S. courts often fail to utilize open interpretations of
categories of persecution, such as membership in a particular social
group and political opinion?40 The answer to this question was well
expressed by the 9th Circuit in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS.4 ' by opening the
refugee definition, the court risks "extending refugee status to every
alien displaced by general conditions of unrest or violence in his or
her home country."42 For example, if a court were to grant asylum to a
woman who is continually abused by her husband, then the court risks
the potential of having to extend refugee status to a vast number of
abused women around the world. This fear of "opening the flood-
gates" underlies the United States restrictive asylum policies. 43 In lim-
iting the scope of who can apply for asylum by narrowly interpreting
the elements of the refugee definition, courts ensure that the United
States is not faced with accepting vast demographic groups of people
from oppressed countries throughout the world.44 By narrowing these
definitions, however, courts create arbitrary hierarchies of persecution:
abuse by government officials and forced recruitment by guerrilla
groups is afforded protection through asylum, but abuse by one's hus-
band and forced female genital mutilation is not. Such hierarchies
discriminate against groups of refugees like women raising gender-
based persecution claims. In order for the United States to extend
asylum to women making gender-based claims, the "opening the flood-
gates" problem must be faced. Part III will show that Canada has cre-
ated guidelines which both extend asylum to women making gender-
based claims and ensure that the country is not faced with an uncon-
trollable amount of applicants.
38 See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 584-85. For a discussion of Canada's recognition of
state liability for private actors, see infra notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
39 See gnerally Goldberg, supra note 10. She argues that the particular social group cate-
gory was "meant to be broader than the other categories and was included in the 1951 Con-
vention definition to protect refugees from forms of persecution that arose from
unforeseeable circumstances." Id. at 590 (citing ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, 1 THE STATUS OF REFU-
GEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1966)).
40 See supra note 37.
41 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
42 Id. at 1577.
43 Peter C. Godfrey, Note, Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings: The Expansion of
the Social Group to Include a Broader Class of Refugees, 3J.L. & POL'v 257, 280 (1994).
44 Id.
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III. The Canadian Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: A Systematic
Method for Evaluating Gender-Related Persecution
Claims
In recognition of the difficulties frequently faced by women refu-
gees presenting gender-based persecution claims, the Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) developed the Canada Guidelines
(Guidelines) 45 "to deal. more sensitively with gender-related refugee
claims-both from substantive and procedural perspectives."46 These
Guidelines were first issued under a new provision in recent amend-
ments to Canada's Immigration Act 47 which authorized the IRB
Chairperson to develop guidelines to assist the IRB staff in carrying out
their duties.48 The Guidelines are an international first in that they
"formally address [ ] the rights of refugee women in the context of do-
mestic refugee determination systems and [they] recogniz[e] that wo-
men fleeing persecution because of their gender can be found to be
refugees."49 The Guidelines ensure that the 1951 Convention 50 is ap-
plied to gender-related refugee claims in Canada "in a way which ac-
knowledges the different forms of persecution experienced by women
in their countries of origin." 51
A. The Guidelines
The Guidelines begin by stating that when a woman claims to have
a gender-related fear of persecution, the central issue is the determina-
tion of the "linkage between gender, the feared persecution, and one
or more of the five definition grounds:"52 race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, and membership in a particular social group. Estab-
lishing this linkage in order to prove a valid gender-based claim in-
volves a number of substantive issues which the Guidelines address.
45 CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10.
46 Nurjehan Mawani, Violations of the Rights of Women in the Refugee Context, Ad-
dress to the Human Rights Centre, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, in NAT'LJ. CONSr.
L., Nov. 1995, at 66. For another discussion of the Canada Guidelines, see Walter C. Long,
Escape from Wonderland: Implementing Canada's Rational Procedures to Evaluate Women's Gender-
Related Asylum Claims, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 179 (1994). See also, Kristine M. Fox, Comment,
Gender Persecution: Canadlan Guidelines Offer A Model For Refugee Determination in the United
States, 11 Ajuz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 117 (1994).
47 Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-2, § 65(3) (1993) (Can.).
48 Id. The IRB has jurisdiction over refugee determinations and hears about 25,000
claims for refugee status per year. SAMUEL BERMAN & CAROLINE MCCHESNEY, REFUGEE DETER-
MINATION PROCEEDINGS 3 (1995).
49 Nurjehan Mawani, Determining Gender-Related Claims to Refugee Status: The Ca-
nadian Perspective, Address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1 (Apr. 19,
1994) (transcript on file with the author).
50 See 1951 Convention, supra note 34.
51 Nurjehan Mawani, Determining Gender-Related Claims to Refugee Status: The Cana-
dian Perspective, Address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1 (Apr. 19,
1994) (transcript on file with the author).
52 CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 1.
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1. Interpreting the 1951 Convention Definitions of Refugee to
Include Women53
The Guidelines recognize that, although gender is not specifically
enumerated as one of the grounds for establishing 1951 Convention
refugee status, the 1951 Convention can be interpreted to provide pro-
tection to women making gender-based claims on any one or a combi-
nation of the five enumerated grounds.54 Before determining the
appropriate grounds applicable to a particular claim, the Guidelines
require that the decision maker identify the nature of the persecution
experienced or feared by the claimant.55 Recognizing that women can
suffer different forms of persecution from men, the Guidelines identify
four broad, nonexclusive categories of persecution that women refu-
gees face. First, women can fear persecution under "the same 1951
Convention grounds, and in similar circumstances, as men."56 Second,
women can fear persecution because of kinship.57 In addition, women
can fear persecution resulting from "circumstances of severe discrimi-
nation on the grounds of gender," or resulting from violent acts by
public authorities or private citizens against which the state is either
unwilling or unable to offer protection. 58 Finally, women can fear per-
secution as a "consequence for failing to conform to, or for trans-
gressing, gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and
practices in their country of origin."59
Once the nature of the persecution that a claimant faces has been
identified, the decision maker will then determine if the basis of the
persecution falls within one of the five enumerated 1951 Convention
grounds. The Guidelines explain how gender-based claims fit into
each of the five 1951 Convention categories.
The first category is race. The Guidelines reveal that women refu-
gees may fear persecution both because of their race and their gen-
der.60 The Guidelines use an example of an Asian woman living in an
African society who may fear persecution because of her race and her
gender.61
Similarly, a gender-based claim may interact with religion. Ac-
53 CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 1.
54 d.
55 Id. at 2.
56 Id. When women fear persecution on the same grounds and in the same circum-
stances as men, the substantive analysis of the claim does not change due to the woman's
gender. Id. However, the procedural issues may vary at the hearing in order to be sensitive
to the particular harms that she may have experienced as a function of her gender. Id.
57 ld. at 3. Kinship persecution occurs because of the views and activities of their
spouses, parents, or other relatives. Id. Women are often harassed in order to reveal infor-
mation about these relatives. Id. Women also may have the same political opinions of these
family members "imputed" to them. Id.
58 I&
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 4.
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cording to the Guidelines, "[t]he notion of religion may encompass
[both] the freedom to hold a belief system of one's choice or not to
hold a particular belief system [as well as] the freedom to practice a
religion of one's own choice or not to practice a prescribed [sys-
tem]."62 As an example of gender-based religious persecution, the
Guidelines state that a woman who lives in an Islamic society and
"chooses not to subscribe to or follow the precepts of a state religion
may be at risk of persecution for reasons of religion."63
A gender-based persecution claim also may be based on national-
ity if, under a national law, an applicant's marriage to a foreign na-
tional may cause her to lose her citizenship. 64 In this situation, "it is
not the fact of losing her nationality.., but the consequences she may
suffer as a result" of the loss, that "constitutes good grounds for fearing
persecution."65
Gender-based persecution can also occur due to a woman's polit-
ical opinion. Specifically, "[a] woman who opposes institutionalized
discrimination of women, or expresses views of independence from
male social/cultural dominance in her society, may fear persecution
for reasons of imputed political opinion, because she is perceived by
the established social/political structure as expressing politically antag-
onistic views." 66 When interpreting the concept of "political opinion,"
decision makers must consider two factors. First, in societies where
women are subordinated, women's political protest may occur in ways
that differ from men.67 Second, the oppression of women by both reli-
gious laws and rituals can be political in nature.68 In other words, a
woman's failing to conform to religious laws may be interpreted as a
threat to the society and the authority's political power, and a woman
may be persecuted for challenging this power.69
Finally, a woman may experience persecution solely by reason of
her gender, and therefore may bring a claim on the grounds of mem-
bership in a particular social group of women. 70 Membership in a cer-
tain family can also be classified as membership in a particular social
group. 71 When employing membership in a particular social group as
a ground for gender-based persecution, the Guidelines suggest that
the decision maker keep the following considerations in mind: (1) it is
immaterial that a "particular social group consists of large numbers of
62 Jd
63 J&
64 1&
65 Id
66 Id,
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id
70 d, at 5. The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly affirmed the idea that gender
can by itself be the basis for membership in a particular social group. Ward v. Attorney Gen.
of Can., 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (1993).
71 CANADA GuIDELINES, supra note 10, at 5.
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the female population in the country concerned;" 72 instead, what is
material is evidence that this particular group of women fears suffering
persecution that is distinguishable from other women or from the gen-
eral population; 73 (2) an identifiable sub-group of women may exist
when women living in a particular area are exposed to and denied
protection from physical, cultural, and domestic violence; 74 and (3)
refugee status is an "individual remedy."75 Thus, when a female refu-
gee makes a claim under any of the five enumerated grounds, she must
show that
she has a genuine fear of harm, that her gender is the reason for the
feared harm, that the harm is sufficiently serious to amount to perse-
cution, that there is a reasonable possibility for the feared persecution
to occur if she is to return to her country of origin and, that she has no
reasonable expectation of adequate national protection. 76
As illustrated above, the Guidelines have interpreted each of the
five 1951 Convention grounds to include the persecutory experiences
unique to women. At the same time, the Guidelines acknowledge the
potential of "opening the floodgates" to vast amounts of women, espe-
cially in the "particular social group category." 77 In recognition of this
problem, the Guidelines stress that asylum is an "individual remedy"78
and require the female applicant to meet specific requirements. 79
2. Under What Situations Does Sexual Violence or the Threat of
Sexual Violence, or Other Discriminatory Treatment of
Women Constitute Persecution?80
Women can experience persecution in ways that differ from men,
such as rape, "infanticide, genital mutilation, bride burning, forced
marriage, domestic violence, forced abortion, and compulsory
sterilizations."81 However, the fact that particular forms of violence
against women, such as spousal abuse are prevalent throughout the
world is irrelevant when deciding whether a gender-related crime con-
stitutes persecution.8 2 Instead, the important issues are whether the
violence or cultural norm is a "serious violation of a fundamental
human right"8 3 and whether the risk of violence stems from a failure of
72 Id at 6.
73 ld.
74 Id
75 Id.
76 Id. The application of these specific requirements is discussed in Part III.B.
77 See id.
78 Id.
79 See supra text accompanying note 76.
80 CANADA GuIDELINFS, supra note 10, at 1.
81 Id at 7.
82 Id
83 Id The social, cultural, traditional and religious norms and laws affecting women
can be assessed by reference to human rights instruments which provide a framework of
international standards. Id. Such international instruments include, but are not-limited to:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [here-
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state protection. 84
The Guidelines further state that "[a] woman's claim to [1951]
Convention refugee status cannot be based solely on the fact that she is
subject to a national policy or law to which she objects."85 In order to
establish that she is persecuted by the law or policy, the applicant must
show that either "the policy or law is inherently persecutory,"8 6 or "the
policy or law is used as a means of persecution for one of the enumer-
ated 1951 Convention grounds,"87 or "the policy or law, although hav-
ing legitimate goals, is administered through a persecutory means,"88
or "the penalty for non-compliance with the policy or law is dispropor-
tionately severe."8 9
The Guidelines recognize that a particular law or policy can func-
tion in a persecutor)i'manner9 ° and thus'a woman can be granted asy-
lum due to her forced exposure to the law or policy. However, just
because a woman has been exposed to a law she does not like does not
mean that she will automatically be granted refugee status. Rather, she
must show that the law violates a fundamental human right and that
the harm she has experienced resulted from a failure of state protec-
tion.91 As the cases in Part III.B will show, Canada's interpretation of
"failure of state protection" holds states accountable for state inac-
tion-their failure to protect women against either public or private
violence. 92 Women can therefore gain protection under the Conven-
tion from persecutory acts committed by private individuals.
3. Key Evidentiary Elements for Gender-Related Claims9"
To establish a gender-related fear of persecution, the evidence
must show that the claimant genuinely fears persecution based on a
1951 Convention ground as distinguished from random acts of vio-
lence committed against the claimant.9 4 The chief factor in the assess-
ment of this aspect of a gender-related claim is the applicant's
inafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Conven-
tion on the Political Rights of Women, openedfor signature Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193
U.N.T.S. 135; Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S.
65. Id. What constitutes permissible standards by a state towards women may also be deter-
mined by reference to international instruments. Id.
84 I&
85 Id. at 8.
86 Id.
87 ld
88 Id
89 I&
90 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
91 CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 8.
92 See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
93 CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 1.
94 Id. at 8.
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"particular circumstances in relation to both the general human rights
record of her country of origin and the experiences of similarly situ-
ated women." 95 The Guidelines recognize the difficulty that women
may face in proving their claims. 96 Thus, as the IRB cases adjudicated
under the Guidelines will show, decision makers have examined the
human rights record of the applicant's country of origin and the ex-
periences of other similarly situated women in order to assess the cred-
ibility of the applicant's story.97
The Guidelines suggest that the weight and credibility of the
claimant's evidence be evaluated in light of a number of considera-
tions. First, "[a] gender-related claim cannot be rejected simply be-
cause the applicant comes from a country where women face
generalized oppression" or persecution.98 Also, when a gender-related
claim involves sexual violence perpetrated by agents of the state or citi-
zens the state cannot control, the claimant may have difficulty support-
ing her claim with statistical data measuring sexual violence in her
country of origin. 99 In addition, a state government can be considered
to be condoning sexual violence if it has been aware that such violence
existed and did nothing to stop the violence; in this case, the applicant
would be considered to be without state protection. 100 The Guide-
lines, while requiring that the claimant genuinely fear persecution,
also recognize that women may face particular evidentiary problems.
By recognizing and calling attention to these problems, the Guidelines
minimize the possibility that these problems alone will destroy a wo-
man's claim.
4. Special Problems Faced by Female Applicants at Refugee
Determination Hearingsl0 :
Special problems may arise at determination hearings "because of
cross-cultural misunderstandings." 102 One such situation that the
Guidelines describe occurs when the applicant is a woman from a soci-
ety where "the preservation of one's virginity or marital dignity is the
cultural norm."103 This norm may cause her to be reluctant to discuss
her experiences of sexual violence, because, to do so, would be to
openly admit her "shame" and to dishonor her family.10 4 Further-
more, some women come from cultures where men do not disclose
95 I
96 Id. The Guidelines recognize that the violence women experience may not be docu-
mented by traditional notions of reliable data. Id.
97 See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
98 CANADA GumEINES, supra note 10, at 8.9 9 Id
100 I&
101 d at 1.
102 I. at 9.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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details of their political, military, or social activities to their female fam-
ily members.10 5 Due to a lack of knowledge, these women may find
themselves unable to answer questions about the associations, exper-
iences, and actions of their male relatives.1 0 6 In addition, female
claimants who have suffered sexual violence or domestic violence may
require "extremely sensitive handling."10 7 Thus, the Guidelines sug-
gest that, in some cases, it may be appropriate for claimants to testify
either by means of affidavit, videotape, or in front of specially trained
hearing officers.' 08
By acknowledging that women often experience persecution in
different ways from men and by recognizing that these forms of perse-
cution are protected under the 1951 Convention, the Guidelines have
opened up the possibility of asylum to women who fear gender-related
persecution. In essence, the Guidelines have collapsed the gender-
based persecution hierarchies that still persist in the United States. 109
B. Immigration and Refugee Board Cases Adjudicated with the Use of
the Canada Guidelines11 0
Although the Guidelines increase the types and number of claim-
ants that can apply for refugee status by broadly interpreting the 1951
Convention refugee definition, the adjudication process controls the
"bursting of the floodgates" problem by assessing the applicant's credi-
bility, determining the possibility of state protection and/or an "inter-
nal flight alternative," 1 1 and separating gender-related fears of
persecution from mere dislike of a country's law or policy.
The stories of persecution described below include spousal abuse,
rape, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, child custody dis-
crimination, forced following of religious customary laws, abuse and
stalking by a military solider, and abuse and stalking by a private citi-
zen. The claims are grounded in one or a combination of the Conven-
tion categories of membership in a particular social group, political
opinion, religion, and race.
105 Id.
106 idt
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See discussion supra part II.
110 The unpublished IRB decisions discussed in this section were chosen by the staff of
the IRB as representative of the types of gender-related cases adjudicated by the IRB, and
representative of the types of claimants that are granted or denied asylum. The author had
access to only those unpublished decisions that were chosen by the IRB staff. The cases were
sanitized by the IRB staff for the protection and privacy of the refugees. All of the
unpublished decisions discussed are on file with the author. The cases are cited in the
format suggested by the Convention Refugee Determination Division [CRDD] of the IRB.
11 An "internal flight alternative" is the ability of an applicant to live safely in another
part of her home country. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Annotated
Thesaurus Legal Issue List (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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1. Membership in a Particular Social Group
This section presents six claims of persecution based on member-
ship in a particular social group. The first five stories are described
and then analyzed together. The sixth story, because it shows the
IRB's capacity to be selective in distinguishing valid spousal abuse
claims from invalid claims, is presented and analyzed separately.
Applicant A was a female student at a university in Pakistan.1 12 In
August 1992, the applicant was returning from a meeting of a student
political group when she was attacked, beaten, and raped by a member
of a rival student political group.' 13 "Because of strict social mores and
laws concerning rape in Pakistan, the applicant did not report the rape
nor did she admit to being raped when questioned by a doctor."114
The applicant also feared that if her father knew about the rape, he
would have her killed "in order to protect the family honor."115 When
she finally went with her mother to the police station to report the
beating (but not the rape), the police laughed at her and disbelieved
her story "because it took her two days to report the incident." 1 6 As a
result of the rape, the applicant became pregnant and could not re-
ceive an abortion because they are illegal in Pakistan. 117 The applicant
explained that under, the law of the Koran, which prevails in Pakistan,
"persons who have relations outside of marriage could face a death
sentence."' 18 The applicant would have had to prove that she did not
fornicate by producing "four Muslim men who would testify that they
witnessed the rape and penetration," which the applicant could not
do.119 The applicant claimed to fall under the 1951 Convention refu-
gee definition by reason of her "membership in a particular social
group-a single, raped Pakistani female with a child born out of
wedlock."120
Applicant B was a Honduran woman who was subject to "severe
spousal abuse by her former common-law husband."12' The applicant
reported the incidents of abuse to the police, who "summoned the
husband to come and sign a document which stated that he would be
fined if he struck the applicant again."122 The fine for violating the
signed document was a two-day jail sentence, which the husband's
112 CRDD U93-06372, Fraser, Silcoff, at 1 (Oct. 1, 1993).
113 Id,
114 Id. at 2.
115 1&
116 Id
117 Id at 3.
118 Id
119 J
120 Id at 1. The applicant also claimed to be a refugee by reason of her political opin-
ion. Id. The IRB did not grant asylum on this basis. Id. at 5.
121 CRDD C93-00288, Wieler, Pawa, at 1 (Sept. 16, 1993).
122 Id. at 2.
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mother kept her son from serving by paying bail.' 23 Thus, the hus-
band was free, and no prohibitions were placed upon him with regard
to seeing or abusing the applicant. 12 4 The husband continued to beat
and threaten the applicant with knives and guns. 125 In April 1990, he
attempted to kill her with a broken bottle. 126 The applicant moved in
with her parents for protection, but the husband stalked her at work
and attacked her with a knife, even attacking a co-worker in her pres-
ence. 12 7 In 1991, the husband abducted and hid the couple's daugh-
ter.128 A court ordered the return of the child, but nothing was done
about the physical abuse. 129 The applicant stopped reporting the
abuse to the police because the police would not respond.' 30 The ap-
plicant finally left the country for fear of being killed by her hus-
band. 31 After the applicant left, her mother informed her that the
husband continued to threaten the applicant and the applicant's par-
ents.13 2 The applicant claimed refugee status because she had a "well-
founded fear of persecution for reason of membership in a particular
social group"-"Honduran women subject to wife abuse."' 33
Applicant C was a Salvadoran woman who was attacked with a ma-
chete by a Salvadoran soldier at a soccer match.13 4 The applicant's
father tried to defend her and was also injured.13 5 Due to her injuries,
the applicant was in the hospital for eight days. Upon release from the
hospital, the applicant went with her doctor and her father to the po-
lice station to report the attack.'3 6 The police told the applicant that
they could do nothing about the attack because the assailant was a sol-
dier.13 7 Later that year, the same assailant soldier came to the appli-
cant's home and tried to abduct her.138 Fortunately, her aunt heard
her screaming and called her uncles who overpowered the assailant. 139
The applicant's parents went to talk to the soldier and his parents, but
the applicant's parents were told by the soldier that he would never
leave their daughter alone.140 The applicant and her parents decided
123 Id.
124 Id
125 Id.
126 ld,
127 Id.
128 Id. at 3.
129 Id. Apparently, their two children are with the claimant's parents. Id.
130 Id.
13 1 Id.
132 Id
133 Id. at 1.
134 CRDD T93-08795, Hope, Winkler, at 2 (Mar. 8, 1994).
35 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
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that it was best for her to leave El Salvador for her protection. 141 After
leaving the country, the applicant's father told her that the soldier had
said he would stay in the army until the applicant returned, and when
she did return he would kill her. ' 42 The soldier reported to the father
that his position in the army prevented anyone from doing anything
against him.143 The applicant based her persecution claim on her
membership in a particular social group-young rural women trapped
in an environment that denies them protection.144
Applicant D and her daughter were Somali citizens. 145 At the age
of sixteen, the applicant entered into an arranged marriage with a man
twenty years her elder. 46 The applicant testified that during their
eleven-year marriage her husband "drank excessively and repeatedly
beat her and their daughter.' 47 The applicant stated that she re-
mained with her husband out of fear that he would take the children if
she left him.148 As punishment for disagreeing with him, the appli-
cant's husband hid their first born son, now twelve, and refused to
allow him to have any contact with her.' 49 The applicant's husband
later divorced her, and, as a male, was automatically entitled to custody
of the children under Somali law. 150 The applicant left Somalia with
her other two children. She stated that her former husband had ties to
the Issaq Somali National Movement and therefore, if she was re-
turned to Somalia, it would be impossible for her to escape control of
her husband and his family.' 51 The applicant related that she would
be destroyed if she could not see her children, and she emphasized
that if she were to lose custody of her daughter, she would be power-
less to prevent her daughter from being genitally mutilated, a widely
practiced custom in Somalia. 152 The applicant was herself genitally
mutilated when she was eight and did not want her daughter to suffer
in the same way. 153 The applicant and her daughter thus claimed to
be Convention refugees on the basis of their fear of persecution on the
grounds of membership in a particular group-women.' 54
Applicant E was an Iranian woman who claimed that Islamic law
fundamentally required her to change her lifestyle because she was de-
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1.
145 CRDD T93-12198, T93-12199, T93-12197, Ramirez, McCaffrey, at 1 (May 10, 1994).
146 Id. at 2.
147 Id.
148 Id. The applicant testified that her husband had taken their first-born child out of
the home when he was only one year old as an act of retribution against the applicant after
she had asked for a divorce. Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 3.
151 Id.
152 Id. For a discussion of FGM, see supra note 5.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1.
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nied higher education for her failure to wear a veil. 155 The applicant
stated that, despite her love for education, she refused to wear the veil
because she was ideologically opposed to the laws of Islam as they per-
tain to women. 156 The applicant also testified that she had discovered
that an outstanding warrant for her arrest existed dating from the time
when she had donated money to her son and his friends who were
protesting against the Islamic regime under the Ayatollah
Khomeini. 157 The applicant fled Iran and stated that she feared re-
turning to Iran "because [she is] a woman and [is] known as someone
who is opposed to the Islamic republic and Islamic law."158 The appli-
cant therefore "claimed a well-founded fear of persecution based on
her political opinion and her. membership in a particular social
group"-women. 159
.
Applicants A, B, C, D, and E all claimed to have a well-founded
fear of persecution by reason of membership in a particular social
group. Applicant E also claimed a well-founded fear of persecution on
the basis of her political opinion. 160 The IRB granted asylum to appli-
cants A,16 1 B,1 6 2 C, 16 3 and D 164 but denied asylum to applicant E. 1 6 5
The four applicants granted asylum shared four general factors.
The first factor common to these applicants was their ability to
distinguish themselves as members of a particular social group. The
Supreme Court of Canada 166 and the Canada Guidelines 167 have rec-
ognized that a woman can be a member of a particular social group
just on the basis of her gender. In applicant A's case, the IRB found
that the Pakistani criminal justice system had created "an extremely
155 CRDD T93-00768, Vickers, Morrison, at 2 (May 20, 1993).
156 Id"
157 Id at 3.
158 Id
159 Id at 1.
160 See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
161 CRDD U93-06372, Fraser, Silcoff, at 7 (Oct. 1, 1993).
162 CRDD C93-00288, Wieler, Pawa, at 7 (Sept. 1, 1993).
163 CRDD T93-08795, Hope, Winkler, at 11 (Mar. 8, 1994).
164 CRDD T93-12198, T93-12199, T93-12197, Ramirez, McCaffrey, at 7 (found for
mother), 11 (found for daughter) (May 10, 1994).
165 CRDD T93-00768, Vickers, Morrison, at 12 (May 20, 1993).
166 See Ward v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 2 S.C.R 689, 739 (1993). The Court identified
three categories of particular social group:
(1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic (for example,
individuals fearing persecution on the basis of gender, linguistic background
and sexual orientation);
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to
their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association
(for example, human rights activists); and
(3) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its his-
torical permanence. An example of such a group might be persons who were
capitalists and independent businessmen in pre-communist Eastern Europe.
Chan v. Minister of Employment and Immigr., 20 Immigr. L.R.2d 181, 190 (F.CA 1993)
(citin to Ward, 2 S.C.R. 689):1 6 CANADA GuIDELINES, supra note 10, at 5.
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adverse and precarious situation for women, and in particular for wo-
men victims of rape."168 The applicant was pregnant as the result of
her rape, and because she did not have four Muslim witnesses to testify
to her rape and penetration, she would be punished under the law,
whether she complained about the rape or not.169 Citing the Canada
Guidelines as authority, the IRB panel thus found that the applicant
was a member of a particular social group on the basis of her
gender.1 70
The IRB panel determined that applicant B was a member of a
particular social group by finding that "women who are subject to do-
mestic violence and abuse share a similar background and should be
categorized as a, particular social group."1 71 In applicant C's case, the
IRB panel identified her gender-defined group as "young rural women
exposed to an environment that denies them protection." 172
Applicant D was a member of a particular social group of divorced
mothers who, under the jurisdiction of Sharia law, do not have their
rights as parents upheld as required under international human rights
instruments.1 73 Applicant D's daughter was also found to be a mem-
ber of-a particular social group on the basis of gender, because under
international human rights instruments her rights to personal security
would be violated if forced to undergo female genital mutilation. 174
Unlike the previous claimants, applicant E, who was denied asy-
lum, could not show that she was a member of a particular social group
based on gender because the IRB panel found there to be "encourag-
ing signs of change in the role of women in Iranian society." 175 Thus
applicant E should no longer have experienced discrimination on the
basis of her gender on her return to Iran.
In all of these cases, the IRB recognized that gender is "an innate
or unchangeable characteristic" 176 and thus, when persecution occurs
because of gender, gender can be the defining characteristic of a par-
ticular social group.
The second factor shared by the applicants who were granted asy-
lum was proof that the state was unable or unwilling to protect them
168 CRDD U93-06372, Fraser, Silcoff, at 6-7 (Oct. 1, 1993).
169 Id. at 7.
170 Id
171 CRDD C93-00288, Wieler, Pawa, at 4 (Sept. 1, 1993) (citing CRDD U92-008714,
Maraj, Shecter, at 7 (June 4, 1992)).
172 CRDD T93-08795, Hope, Winkler, at 10 (Mar. 8, 1994).
173 CRDD T93-12198, T93-12199, T93-12197, Ramirez, McCaffrey, at 5 (May 10, 1994).
The panel referred to the UDHR, supra note 83, at art. 3, 7, and CEDAW, supra note 83, at
art. 15.
174 Id. at 11-12 (referring to the UDHR, supra note 83, at art. 3, and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signatureJan. 26, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1340, at
arts. 19, 24, 37).
175 CRDD T93-00768, Vickers, Morrison, at 7 (May 20, 1993).
176 See, e.g., CRDD T93-12198, T93-12199, T93-12197, Ramirez, McCaffrey, at 11 (May
10, 1994).
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from persecution. The Canada Guidelines state that in order for a
claimant to be considered a 1951 Convention refugee, the violence ex-
perienced by the woman must "result from a failure of state protec-
tion."1 77 The women claimants therefore needed to show that they
tried to seek state protection and that none existed. It is clear that
applicant A had no state protection insofar as the police laughed at
her when she reported part of her attack, and she faced persecution
from the religious state that might have sentenced her to death for
being a single female with a child born out of wedlock. 178 Applicant B
also established that the police provided no protection from her abu-
sive husband, and that there was nowhere in the country that she could
escape the abuse of her husband. In other words, she had no "internal
flight alternative." 179 Applicant C showed that there was no protection
from a Salvadoran military solider-an agent of the state.180 Applicant
D was in a position arguably different from other women in her coun-
try. Specifically, because applicant D's husband was so well-connected
to high government officials, the state would not stop the abduction of
her children, the threats against the applicant, or the forced female
genital mutilation of her daughter. 181
A third factor that the applicants granted asylum shared was that
the violence or discrimination they suffered rose to the level of perse-
cution. The Canada Guidelines call for the use of numerous human
rights instruments to determine whether a particular action rises to the
level of persecution. 182 However, when an applicant is basing her
claim on a law or policy, the Canada Guidelines state that the claim for
1951 Convention status cannot be based solely on the fact she is sub-
ject to a national policy or law to which she objects. 183 The Canada
Guidelines list four types of persecutory laws as opposed to merely dis-
criminatory laws. 184 For applicant A, the law that a woman must pro-
duce four male Muslim witnesses to prove that she was raped was
found to be inherently persecutory. 185 Furthermore, the fact that wo-
men who have sexual relations outside of marriage can be subject to
death seemed a disproportionately severe penalty.186 Applicants B and
C did not base their claims for persecution on a particular law or pol-
icy. 18 7 The IRB panel defined the persecution suffered by applicant B
177 CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 7.
178 CRDD U93-06372, Fraser, Silcoff, at 2 (Oct. 1, 1993).
179 CRDD C93-00288, Wieler, Pawa, at 3 (Sept. 1, 1993). See supra note 111 for a descrip-
tion of internal flight.
180 CRDD T93-08795, Hope, Winkler, at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 1994).
181 CRDD T93-12198, T93-12199, T93-12197, Ramirez, McCaffrey, at 3 (May 10, 1994).
182 CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 7.
183 Id. at 8.
184 CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 8. For a list of the requirements, see supra text
accompanying notes 94-97.
185 See CRDD U93-06372, Fraser, Silcoff, at 6-7 (Oct. 1, 1993).
186 Id. at 6.
187 See supra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
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through the use of international instruments.188 Insofar as there is no
direct discussion of the type of persecution that applicant C suffered,
the IRB panel seemed to consider that the applicant's exposure to the
stalker soldier was inherently persecutory.189 For applicant D, the law
which stated that women automatically lose custody of their children
upon divorce seemed inherently persecutory.190 The panel also used
international instruments to show that the state persecuted applicant
D by compromising certain basic human rights identified by these in-
struments.1 91 The IRB panel found that applicant E, who was denied
the opportunity to complete her higher education, was merely discrim-
inated against as opposed to being persecuted.1 92 Specifically, the IRB
panel stated that differences in the way groups are treated do not rise
to a level of persecution unless they constitute a "serious restriction[ ]
on [the] right to earn a livelihood, [the] right to practice religion, or
[are a bar to the] access of normally available educational facilities."' 9 3
This language underscores the principle that discriminatory treatment
rises to a level of persecution when a fundamental human right con-
tained in an international instrument is violated.' 94
The fourth factor that the successful asylum applicants shared can
be characterized as general credibility. This notion of credibility takes
different forms depending on the particular situation of the applicant.
For some applicants, credibility may not become an issue at all. For
example, the IRB panel did not raise the issue of credibility with appli-
cants A and B. 195 The credibility of applicant C was questioned due to
some conflicting evidence presented by the refugee hearing officer,
but the IRB found applicant C's story to be credible in light of what is
generally known about the conditions in El Salvador.1 96 The credibil-
ity of applicant D's testimony was also generally accepted by the IRB
panel insofar as credibility was not raised as an issue by the IRB
Panel. 197 Applicant E, who was denied refugee status, was not found to
188 For applicant B, the panel referred to the UDHR, supra note 83, and the UNHCR
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COM-
MISSIONER ON REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEE WOMEN, U.N. Doc. ES/
SCP/67 (1991). See CRDD C93-00288, Wieler, Pawa, at 4-5 (Sept. 15, 1993).
189 CRDD T93-08795, Hope, Winkler, at 5-11 (Mar. 8, 1994).
190 CRDD T93-12198, Ramirez, McCaffrey, at 5 (May 10, 1994).
191 Id. Specifically, the Panel refers to the UDHR, supra note 83, and the CEDAW, supra
note 83.
192 CRDD T93-00768, Vickers, Morrison, at 7 (May 20, 1993). The applicant's dislike of
having to wear a veil was also determined to be choice in dress style rather than a political
opinion. Id. at 8.
193 Id. at 7-8 (citing UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CoNvENTION
AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 15 (1979) [hereinafter
UNHCR HANDBOOK]).
194 See CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 7.
195 See CRDD U93-06372, Fraser, Silcoff (Oct. 1, 1993); CRDD C93-00288, Wieler, Pawa
(Sept. 15, 1993).
196 CRDD T93-08795, Hope, Winkler, at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 1994).
197 See CRDD T93-12198, Ramirez, McCaffrey (May 10, 1994).
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be credible by the IRB panel because she was vague and evasive in
responding to questions by the panel. 198 In particular, the IRB further
questioned why applicant E did not make a refugee claim when she
visited two of her sons that lived in Germany and England. 199 The IRB
panel stated that the fact that the applicant did not make claims in
either of these countries, while knowing that there was a possibility that
she could be sent back to Iran, "belie[d] the well-foundedness of her
claim."200 As the court indicated, a lack of credibility undermines a
claim for asylum by calling into question the substantive elements of a
claim such as, in applicant E's case, the well-founded fear element. 201
Opponents of a "broadened" interpretation of the refugee defini-
tion may especially worry that the acceptance of spousal abuse claims
under the membership in a particular social group category could po-
tentially subject the United States to an onslaught of legitimate asylums
claims. The IRB Panel has demonstrated that it is possible to be selec-
tive in the decision making process by requiring that the applicant first
seek out all forms of state protection. The next case illustrates this
selectivity.
Applicant F and her children were Israeli citizens.202 According
to the applicant's narrative, her husband was a drug addict who had
abused her and harassed her for money to support his drug habit.203
As a result of the husband's harassment of the applicant at her work-
place, she was fired because her boss feared for the safety of the other
employees. 20 4 The applicant stated that for years she wanted to leave
her marriage, but was afraid of what her husband might do.20 5 How-
ever, as the husband's violence toward the applicant escalated, she
sought an end to the marriage and police protection for herself and
her children. 20 6 The applicant stated that she could find no protec-
tion and was "essentially trapped in an abusive marriage."20 7 The ap-
plicant tried to obtain a divorce, but found that she would have to get
the consent of her husband, who could legally withhold his consent for
198 CRDD T93-00768, Vickers, Morrison, at 4-12 (May 20, 1993). For example, when
asked about the nature of the political activities that her son engaged in and that she alleg-
edly supported, the applicant had no knowledge about the particular political views held by
her son's group other than the fact that they were freedom lovers. Id. at 5; see supra note 157.
The IRB panel found this answer not to be credible in light of the prolonged association that
the applicant had with these individuals. CRDD T93-00768, Vickers, Morrison, at 5 (May 20,
1993).
199 Id
200 Id,
201 See id.
202 CRDD T93-01878, T93-01879, T93-01880, T93-01882, T93-01883, Howson, Griffith,
at 1 (Aug. 30, 1993).
203 Id. at 2.
204 Id
205 Id.
206 Id. at 2-3.
207 Id. at 2.
[VOL. 20
GENDER PERSECUTION CLAIMS
up to fifteen years.208 The applicant fled Israel with her children in
order to escape her abusive marriage. 20 9 The applicant and her chil-
dren claimed a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of member-
ship in a particular social group-a family subject to abuse. 210
In determining whether applicant F had a well-founded fear of
persecution by reason of membership in a particular social group, the
IRB panel accepted the assertion that the applicant and her children
suffered persecution based on membership in their family group.211
The panel then focused its analysis on "whether there was adequate
state protection for this particular family suffering from domestic vio-
lence."2 12 After hearing evidence on the remedies available to protect
battered women, the court found that if the applicant and her chil-
dren returned to Israel at the present time, the applicant would have
"adequate recourse to bring her abusive husband to justice.1213
Although sympathizing with the applicant, it was clear to the panel that
the applicant and her children did not meet the 1951 Convention refu-
gee definition because there was adequate state protection available to
them. 214 This denial exemplifies the fact that all women who suffer
spousal abuse, or other types of violence based on gender, are not nec-
essarily refugees. By requiring applicants to show that they sought and
were denied state protection, the IRB avoids having to accept vast num-
bers of women solely on the basis that they have experienced gender-
related violence.
2. Religion
The Canada Guidelines also recognize that a woman may experi-
ence gender-related persecution based on her choice not to hold a
particular religious belief system.215 For example, applicant G was an
Algerian woman who earned her international Baccalaureate degree
in England.216 When the applicant completed her studies and re-
turned to Algeria, her father decided that she was too "westernized"
and imposed a Muslim way of life upon her.21 7 She was unable to leave
the house alone, her phone calls were censored, and her books were
taken away from her.21 8 When the applicant turned twenty-five, her
father decided that it was time for her to marry and chose a sixty-two-
208 Id.
209 Id. at 3.
210 Id. at 1.
211 Id. at 6.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 8.
214 Id. at 10.
215 CANADA GUIDEUNES, supra note 10, at 4.
216 CRDD M92-06719, de Liarnchin, Vo, at 1-2 (May 11, 1993).
217 I. at 2-3.
218 Id. at 2.
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year-old wealthy friend who was also a devout Muslim.2 19 According to
Islamic tradition, the applicant could not refuse the marriage; in fact,
her presence was not even required at the wedding ceremony.220 She
left Algeria to avoid being subjected to the marriage. 221 She feared
that if she returned to Algeria, her father would kill her for not follow-
ing an Islamic way of life, and she testified that since her family is well-
known in Algeria, she could not have obtained police protection any-
where in the country.22 2 The applicant claimed to have a "well-
founded fear of persecution by reason of her religion."223
Applicant G was granted asylum.224 Citing the Canada Guide-
lines, the IRB panel explained that the notion of religion includes a
freedom "not to hold a particular belief system." 225 By censoring her
phone calls and books and forcing her into a traditional Islamic mar-
riage, the applicant's father had forced her into an Islamic lifestyle.
226
Referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in order to
show persecution, the IRB panel recognized the father's physical and
emotional force to be "a violation of the claimant's security of the per-
son'. . . [which] amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treat-
ment."2 2 7 The IRB panel found the applicant's testimony to be
generally credible and free of exaggeration. 228 Unlike applicant F,
who had access to state remedies against spousal abuse, 229 applicant G
could not have obtained police protection since her family was well
known in Algeria.230 This case illustrates some of the factors that are
required to establish a gender-based religious persecution claim: a
choice not to practice a prescribed religion, harm that rises to the level
of persecution, a credible claimant, and a lack of state protection from
further violence.
3. Political Opinion
The Canada Guidelines also recognize that a woman can experi-
ence gender-related persecution on account of her political opinion.
Applicant H was an Iranian woman who opposed wearing the tradi-
tional Islamic chador.23 1 The applicant stated that she was threatened
219 u. at 3.
220 Id. at 3-4.
221 Id. at 4.
222 Id
223 Id. at 1. The applicant also claimed persecution based on membership in a particular
social group and political opinion. Id. Since the IRB panel granted asylum based on the
religion claim, it found it unnecessary to examine the other claims. Id. at 5.
224 Id at 5.
225 Id at 7.
226 Id
227 Id at 6 (citing the UDHR, supra note 83).
228 Id at 5.
229 See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
230 CRDD M92-06719, de Liamchin, Vo, at 7-8 (May 11, 1993).
231 Parisa Namitabar v. Minister of Employment and Immigr. of Can., No. A-1252-92, at
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with expulsion from school and brought before the authorities twice
for disobeying the clothing code.2 3 2 Three years later, the applicant
and a friend were seized in a shop by the authorities, accused of anti-
Islamic conduct for not wearing the traditional chador, and sentenced
to a choice of either ten strokes with a whip or a payment of a fine.
233
Each of the women's families paid the fine. 23 4 The applicant was later
distributing some political pamphlets with her friend when she was
spotted by a neighbor who verbally abused her.23 5 Her girlfriend's fa-
ther arranged for them to leave Iran.2 36 The applicant claimed a well-
founded fear of persecution by reason of her political opinion.2 37
This case was an appeal from the IRB panel that denied the appli-
cant asylum. The IRB denied the applicant's claim because it found
the law imposing a clothing standard to be generally applicable legisla-
tion and therefore not persecutory in nature.23 8 Disagreeing with the
IRB, the federal court reasoned that "even where there is a law of gen-
eral application, that law may be applied in such a way as to be persecu-
tory."239 The court held that a penalty of seventy-five strokes without
any procedural guarantees was a disproportionate penalty, and there-
fore a persecutory law.240 Furthermore, the court stated that the appli-
cant had a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of her political
opinion because "in a country where the oppression of women is insti-
tutionalized any independent point of view or act opposed to the im-
position of a clothing code will be seen as a manifestation of
opposition to the established theocratic regime. '241 The court accord-
ingly remanded applicant H's claim back to the IRB for further consid-
eration under the standards identified by the court.2 42 Under the
Guidelines, a generally applicable law can be found persecutory when
1-2 (Fed. Ct. of Can., Trial Div. Nov. 5, 1993). The information about this case comes from
an Order of the Trial Division granting judicial review.
232 Id. at 2.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1.
238 Id. at 2.
239 Id. at 4 (quoting Cheung v. Minister of Employment and Immigr. of Can., No. A-785-
91 (F.CA, Apr. 1, 1993) (not reported) (citing Padilla v. Minister of Employment and Im-
migr. of Can., 13 Immigr. L.1L2d 1 (F.C.A. 1991))). In Canada, denials by the IRB can be
appealed to the Federal Trial Court Division and then to the Federal Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court of Canada. Unlike the U.S. courts, the Canadian Federal Trial Courts do
not have jurisdiction over the merits of claims from the IRB so that once they rule on ques-
tions of law, the case is remanded back to the IRB for a final decision on the merits. Walter
C. Long, Escape From Wonderland: Implementing Canada's Rational Procedures to Evaluate Women's
Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 179, 219 n.162 (1994) (referring to an
interview with Rod Catford, Canadian Immigration Attorney (Mar. 10, 1994)).
240 See Parisa Namitabar v. Minister of Employment and Immigr. of Can., No. A-1252-92,
at 4 (Fed. Ct. of Can., Trial Div. Nov. 5, 1993).
241 Id. at 5-6.
242 Id. at 6.
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the penalty is excessive and when opposition to such a law can be
found to be political in nature.
4. Race and Membership in a Particular Social Group
The Canada Guidelines also recognize that a women can experi-
ence gender-related persecution because of her race. As in applicant
I's case below, more than one category of persecution may be asserted.
Applicant I was an Asian woman living in Tanzania.243 The applicant
was physically and sexually abused at her workplace by two men who
claimed that they worked for the Department of Home Affairs. 24 The
applicant reported the incident to her father, who told the applicant to
remain quiet because of Muslim customs. 245 The two men continued
to harass the applicant, but she did not report the abuse because she
was "convinced that the Tanzanian government turns a blind eye to
the physical abuse of women." 24 The applicant's family arranged a
marriage for her, which was Muslim custom, but her fiance called off
the marriage when he learned of her attack.247 The applicant assumed
that the assailants notified her fiance's family about the incident at her
workplace.2 48 After her fiance canceled the marriage, the applicant
took a holiday in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada for
about two months.2 49 The applicant did not seek refugee status in any
of these countries during her visits. 250 When the applicant returned
home, she was harassed by a local party leader and instructed to stand
on night guard duty in her residential area.2 51 The applicant felt un-
easy about being the only Asian woman among five African men on
this guard duty and believed that she was being singled out by the local
party leader, especially because the local leader was acquainted with
one of her assailants.2 52 The applicant's father tried again to arrange a
marriage for her but failed again because, according to the applicant,
the intended's family found out about the sexual abuse.2 53 The harass-
ment from the two men continued, and consequently the applicant
felt that she had no choice but to join her sister in Canada. 25 4 After
arriving in Canada, the applicant spoke with her father, who reported
that one of the male abusers had come to inquire about her wherea-
243 CRDD T93-05072, Howson, Cheeseman, at 1, 4 (Oct. 18, 1993).
244 Id. at 2.
245 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19 for a discussion of problems women
face in Muslim cultures regarding sexual abuse.
246 Id at 3.
247 I&
248 1&.
249 Id,
250 Id.
251 1&
252 Id
253 Id at 4.
254 Id
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bouts. 25 5 The applicant claimed a well-founded fear of persecution for
three reasons: on the basis of her race, Asian; on the basis of her reli-
gion, Muslim; and on the basis of her gender, female (because she was
molested by two males). 2 56
Applicant I's main contention was that she could not turn to the
police for protection because of her racial background and situation:
being an Asian in an African culture.25 7 She believed that if the
problems she had with her two assailants had happened to a black wo-
man, the police would have taken the black woman's case far more
seriously.258 The applicant also believed that she suffered further dis-
advantage because she was a woman.2 5 9 Although sympathizing with
the applicant's plight, the IRB panel found no evidence that the gov-
ernment of Tanzania practiced a policy of discrimination against the
Asian minority.260 Police protection was available to Asians, and they
had as much access to such protection as any other citizen.2 6 1 After
examining evidence about the status of women in Tanzania, the IRB
panel further found it unlikely that the applicant would face persecu-
tion on account of her gender because progress in women's rights was
noticeable in urban areas such as where the applicant lived. 262 The
applicant's claim was denied because she did not establish that her
persecution was the result of either her racial background or her gen-
der.263 This case clearly illustrates that a woman who suffers persecu-
tion does not automatically receive refugee status. She must show that
the reason for the persecution is based on a 1951 Convention ground,
and she must show her country of origin is unwilling or unable to pro-
tect her from the persecution.2 64
C. Summary of the Canada Cases Adjudicated Under the Canada
Guidelines
These cases illustrate how the Canada Guidelines have interpreted
the 1951 Convention definition of refugee to include gender-related
issues. These cases also demonstrate that the Canada Guidelines can
control the floodgate problem through procedural and substantive re-
quirements, and thus, prevent holdings that would allow large popula-
tions of women suffering a particular abuse to seek asylum. A woman
who has suffered spousal abuse must show that no state protection ex-
255 Id
256 1&
257 Id at 6.
258 Id.
259 1&
260 Id. at 7-8.
261 Id at 8.
262 Id at 7.
263 Id at 7-9.
264 Id. at 10.
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ists to stop the abuse. 265 A woman who was forced into marriage by
her father must show that the political power of her father made it
impossible for her to receive police protection. 266 A woman who fears
persecution because of her identification with a political group must
prove her credibility by showing that she knew of the particular beliefs
of this political group, and she must explain why she did not seek refu-
gee status in any of the safe countries that she visited before Canada. 267
These examples, along with others, show that women who suffer gen-
der-related persecution are not automatically granted asylum. They
can be (and are) denied asylum if they do not meet the procedural
and substantive requirements set out in the Guidelines.
IV. Conclusion
Canada is the first nation to interpret the 1951 Convention defini-
tion of refugee to include gender-related persecution claims. By in-
cluding gender-related persecution in the refugee definition, the
Canada Guidelines have broken down discriminatory hierarchies of
persecution that, on the one hand, could find abuse by a guerrilla fac-
tion to be persecution, but, on the other, would find abuse by one's
spouse not to be persecution. In order to control the potential flood
of women applicants following this "broadened" definition, the Can-
ada Guidelines have imposed procedural and substantive elements
that prevent judicial holdings that would grant asylum to vast popula-
tions of women suffering similar abuses.
United States asylum policy, however, still remains restrictive in
the area of gender-related persecution because of the potential "open-
ing the floodgates" problem. 268 The Canadian system for recognizing
gender-related claims, which appears to control the floodgate prob-
lem, should therefore encourage the United States to follow suit. A
framework for incorporating gender-based claims into U.S. asylum law
has been developed by the Women Refugees Project.2 69 These Pro-
posed Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims follow the Canada
Guidelines in recognizing the different forms of persecution exper-
ienced by women, and they impose some of the same substantive and
procedural elements that can control the floodgate problem.270 If
they, or similar guidelines, are adopted by the United States, women
refugees like Fatimah will finally gain equal access to eligibility for asy-
lum in the United States.
STEPHANIE KAYE PELL
265 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
269 Nancy Kelly, et al., Proposed Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, in 71 Inter-
preter Releases 813 (abridged ed. June 27, 1994).
270 Id. at 815-23.
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